{"id":5295,"date":"2026-09-14T00:34:26","date_gmt":"2026-09-14T00:34:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/?p=5295"},"modified":"2026-09-14T00:34:26","modified_gmt":"2026-09-14T00:34:26","slug":"you-paid-for-that-vaccine-so-why-cant-the-world-afford-it","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/you-paid-for-that-vaccine-so-why-cant-the-world-afford-it\/","title":{"rendered":"You Paid for That Vaccine. So Why Can\u2019t the World Afford It?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>The <a href=\"https:\/\/www.who.int\/europe\/emergencies\/situations\/covid-19\">COVID-19 pandemic<\/a> exposed an uncomfortable truth: when American taxpayers fund the science behind life-saving medicines, private companies still get to decide who can afford them.<\/p>\n<p>When <a href=\"https:\/\/www.modernatx.com\/en-US\">Moderna<\/a> developed its groundbreaking <a href=\"https:\/\/www.genome.gov\/genetics-glossary\/Messenger-RNA-mRNA\">mRNA<\/a> COVID vaccine, it did so on the back of <a href=\"https:\/\/www.niaid.nih.gov\/diseases-conditions\/decades-making-mrna-covid-19-vaccines\">decades of government-funded research<\/a> and over <a href=\"https:\/\/pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov\/articles\/PMC10911989\/\">$1 billion<\/a> in federal grants from the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nih.gov\/about-nih\">National Institutes of Health<\/a> (\u201cNIH\u201d). Taxpayers funded the science. But when the vaccine was ready, most of the world did not automatically have access. Why? Moderna held the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.citizen.org\/article\/modernas-mrna-1273-vaccine-patent-landscape\/#_ftn5\">patents<\/a>, a government-granted right to temporarily exclude others from manufacturing or selling the vaccine. In addition, Moderna had <a href=\"https:\/\/www.citizen.org\/article\/modernas-mrna-1273-vaccine-patent-landscape\/#:~:text=Moderna%20suggested%20that%20it%20relies%20to%20a%20certain%20extent%20on%20trade%20secrets%2C%20know%2Dhow%2C%20and%20technology%2C%20which%20are%20not%20protected%20by%20patents%2C%20to%20maintain%20its%20competitive%20position.\">trade secrets<\/a>, confidential business information (such as a formula, process, or manufacturing know-how) that derives its value from not being publicly known and is legally protected from disclosure as long as the owner takes reasonable steps to keep it secret.<\/p>\n<p>Eventually, Moderna <a href=\"https:\/\/investors.modernatx.com\/statements-perspectives\/modernas-updated-patent-pledge\">pledged<\/a> not to enforce its COVID-related patents. But that pledge was far from adequate because it did not include the manufacturing know-how other companies needed to produce the vaccine. So, the real barrier was not only the patents on the vaccines, but the <em>trade secrets<\/em> needed to produce them. Moderna\u2019s grip on its COVID-19 trade secrets put vaccines out of reach for most of the world. While intellectual property (\u201cIP\u201d) protections can encourage innovation, this example exposes gaps in the legal system that must be addressed to ensure that publicly funded medicines actually reach the people who need them.<\/p>\n<p>So why does this matter to U.S. taxpayers? After all, <a href=\"https:\/\/dig.abclocal.go.com\/ccg\/interactives\/us-vaccine-tracker\/vax_us_cdc.html#:~:text=peopl-,e%20(about%2077.1%%20of%20the%20total%20U.S.%20population)%20have%20received%20at%20least%20one%20dose.,-About\">a majority<\/a> of U.S. citizens were able to eventually receive the vaccine. Well, despite the obvious moral obligation, unvaccinated populations anywhere become <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2021\/jul\/17\/unvaccinated-coronavirus-covid-variants-us#:~:text=But%2C%20in%20addition,us%2C\">breeding grounds for new variants<\/a>. These variants can cross borders regardless of our own vaccination rates. Global access is not just a moral obligation. It is a public health necessity for Americans as well.<\/p>\n<p>The existing patent and trade secret model has shown us the consequences: wealthy nations <a href=\"https:\/\/www.doctorswithoutborders.org\/latest\/us-must-stop-hoarding-excess-covid-19-vaccine-doses#:~:text=Even%20while%20factoring%20in%20third%2Ddose%20boosters%20for%20high%2Drisk%20groups%2C%20high%2Dincome%20countries%20are%20hoarding%20an%20estimated%20870%20million%20excess%20doses%E2%80%94nearly%20500%20million%20in%20the%20US%20alone.\">stockpiled vaccine surpluses<\/a> while low and middle-income countries waited. But the solution to this may be easier than it seems. Strategic changes to the funding agreements themselves can create contractional obligations to promote affordable access for lower-income countries worldwide.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The Problem: Public Money, but Private Decision<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Understanding the problem requires understanding how drug development works. The federal government, through agencies like the NIH, funds <a href=\"https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/pulse\/role-federal-funding-drug-development-why-fund-cleary-phd-iyale\/\">a significant portion<\/a> of basic scientific research. This funding flows not just to NIH researchers themselves, but to academic institutions and private companies. The research conducted at this stage encompasses anything from mapping how a virus enters human cells to identifying which proteins make a good vaccine target. It\u2019s slow, unglamorous work. And it\u2019s paid for almost entirely by you.<\/p>\n<p>Once a discovery shows commercial promise, patents are filed on the underlying innovation. In some cases, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.citizen.org\/article\/the-nih-vaccine\/#:~:text=In%20May%202019%2C%20NIH%20and,apply%20to%20this%20new%20project.\">additional research agreements<\/a> fund further development. This all happens <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mintz.com\/insights-center\/viewpoints\/2231\/2023-07-24-why-pharma-companies-should-file-patents-later-rd#:~:text=Clinical%20trial%20related%20patent%20applications%20are%20often%20filed%20prior%20to%20the%20start%20of%20the%20Phase%20I%20clinical%20trial%20to%20minimize%20the%20risk%20of%20invalidation%20of%20the%20resulting%20patent%20for%20public%20use%20(35%20U.S.C.%20%C2%A7%20102(a))%20based%20on%20the%20clinical%20trial%20itself.%C2%A0\">before clinical trials even begin<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Moderna\u2019s COVID-19 vaccine is a perfect case study of this.<\/p>\n<p>The mRNA technology behind the vaccine was developed over decades, funded <a href=\"https:\/\/pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov\/articles\/PMC8426978\/#:~:text=These%20foundational%20advances%20were%20funded%20in%20part%20by%20US%20taxpayers%20and%20laid%20the%20groundwork%20for%20the%20COVID%E2%80%9019%20vaccines%20the%20world%20is%20racing%20to%20get%20into%20as%20many%20arms%20as%20possible.\">in large part<\/a> by NIH grants. NIH scientists also had a <a href=\"https:\/\/pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov\/articles\/PMC8426978\/#:~:text=fundamental%20role%20in%20research%20and%20development%2C%20starting%20from%20the%20inception%20of%20that%20work%20and%20continuing%20to%20the%20present.\">significant role<\/a> in its research and development. When the pandemic hit, the federal government provided Moderna with <a href=\"https:\/\/www.insideprecisionmedicine.com\/news-and-features\/u-s-commits-an-additional-1-5b-to-modernas-covid-19-vaccine-effort\/#:~:text=Roughly%20three%20months,candidate%20mRNA%2D1273.\">additional funding<\/a> to support manufacturing and trials. Moderna did somewhat contribute substantial proprietary work by developing a <a href=\"https:\/\/cen.acs.org\/pharmaceuticals\/drug-delivery\/Without-lipid-shells-mRNA-vaccines\/99\/i8#:~:text=After%20realizing%20that%20MC3%20wouldn%E2%80%99t%20cut%20it%20for%20mRNA%20delivery%2C%20Moderna%20invested%20significant%20resources%20into%20building%20a%20better%20ionizable%20lipid.\">lipid nanoparticle delivery system<\/a> for the mRNA, navigating the clinical trial process, and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.europeanpharmaceuticalreview.com\/news\/moderna-strengthens-us-mrna-manufacturing-capabilities-with-over-140m-investment\/268038.article#:~:text=Moderna%20is%20investing%20more%20than%20$140%20million%20to%20enable%20full%20end%2Dto%2Dend%20manufacturing%20for%20its%20mRNA%20medicines%20in%20the%20US.\">building out manufacturing capacity<\/a>. However, the NIH scientists were only listed as <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/healthcare-pharmaceuticals\/moderna-covid-19-vaccine-patent-dispute-headed-court-us-nih-head-says-2021-11-10\/#:~:text=Moderna%20said%20the%20company%20has%20acknowledged%20NIH%20scientists%20in%20other%20patent%20applications%2C%20such%20as%20those%20related%20to%20dosing.%20But%20for%20the%20core%20patent%2C%20Moderna%20is%20only%20required%20to%20list%20Moderna%20scientists%20as%20inventors%20of%20the%20sequence%20under%20the%20strict%20rules%20of%20U.S.%20patent%20law%2C%20it%20said.\">co-inventors<\/a> on patents <em>relating<\/em> to the COVID vaccine, and not on any covering the actual <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/healthcare-pharmaceuticals\/moderna-covid-19-vaccine-patent-dispute-headed-court-us-nih-head-says-2021-11-10\/#:~:text=Moderna%20said%20the%20company%20has%20acknowledged%20NIH%20scientists%20in%20other%20patent%20applications%2C%20such%20as%20those%20related%20to%20dosing.%20But%20for%20the%20core%20patent%2C%20Moderna%20is%20only%20required%20to%20list%20Moderna%20scientists%20as%20inventors%20of%20the%20sequence%20under%20the%20strict%20rules%20of%20U.S.%20patent%20law%2C%20it%20said.\">underlying mRNA sequence<\/a>. These patents are what grant Moderna and other pharma companies <a href=\"https:\/\/www.als.net\/news\/drug-patents\/#:~:text=In%20the%20US%2C%20as%20well%20as%20most%20other%20countries%2C%20patents%20are%20a%20legal%20mechanism%20that%20allow%20pharmaceutical%20companies%20to%20exclusively%20sell%20a%20drug%20they%20have%20developed%2C%20helping%20them%20recoup%20their%20investment\">exclusivity<\/a> in drug markets.<\/p>\n<p>The pharma industry <a href=\"https:\/\/yalelawjournal.org\/feature\/does-pharma-need-patents#:~:text=Pharmaceuticals%20is%20the%20sector%20most%20widely%20thought%20to%20be%20in%20need%20of%20strong%20patent%20protection%20in%20order%20to%20sustain%20a%20robust%20level%20of%20innovative%20activity.\">frequently argues<\/a> that patents are essential to reward this investment: without a government-guaranteed period of exclusivity, no company would spend years and billions on clinical trials with no guarantee of success. The problem? When the foundational science was built on public funding, the public already absorbed much of that risk.<\/p>\n<p>When the first cases of COVID were announced, it took Moderna <a href=\"https:\/\/investors.modernatx.com\/statements-perspectives\/modernas-updated-patent-pledge#:~:text=in%20October%202020%2C%20we%20voluntarily%20committed%20that%2C%20\">almost a year<\/a> to officially state that it would not enforce its COVID-related patents. Even with that pledge in place, <a href=\"https:\/\/pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov\/articles\/PMC9790937\/#:~:text=Members%20in%20support%20of%20the%20TRIPS%20waiver%20all%20adopted%20the%20position%20that%20IP%20is%20actively%20serving%20as%20a%20supply%20barrier%20by%20preventing%20the%20mass%20manufacture%20of%20needed%20COVID%2D19%20vaccines%2C%20therapeutics%2C%20and%20medical%20devices.\">another IP barrier prevented<\/a> manufacturers in lower-income countries from actually producing the vaccine. This is because Moderna never shared the <a href=\"https:\/\/fortune.com\/2022\/02\/04\/south-africa-afrigen-moderna-covid-vaccine-mrna-who-hotez-corbevax\/#:~:text=Moderna%20refused%20to%20share%20its%20mRNA%20vaccine%20knowledge%20to%20boost%20production%20of%20COVID-19%20vaccines.\">proprietary manufacturing know-how<\/a> behind the vaccine. Complex biologics like mRNA vaccines rely on layers of proprietary manufacturing knowledge, commonly protected by trade secrets entirely separate from the patent itself. In many low-income countries, there may not even have been a patent to worry about in the first place, yet local manufacturers still could not replicate the vaccine because the actual recipe for making it was never disclosed.<\/p>\n<p>Addressing these patent and trade secret barriers means rethinking not just who owns the IP, but what obligations come with the public money that made the innovation possible in the first place.<\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_5296\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-5296\" style=\"width: 300px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-medium wp-image-5296\" src=\"https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/Picture1-300x200.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"200\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/Picture1-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/Picture1-1024x684.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/Picture1-768x513.jpg 768w, https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/Picture1-135x90.jpg 135w, https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/Picture1.jpg 1051w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-5296\" class=\"wp-caption-text\"><em>Image by Ian Hutchinson Courtesy of Unsplash<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p><strong>Potential Fixes: Make Public Funding Come With Public Conditions<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The most direct fix would be legislation voiding trade secret protections for federally funded vaccines. But creating a law that strips trade secret protections would face serious legal challenges and no realistic political path forward. It also assumes that patent rights aren\u2019t another barrier to access. Hoping companies will voluntarily pledge not to enforce their patents is wishful thinking. Even in cases where they do, these pledges can be limited or withdrawn, and Moderna\u2019s came only after the pandemic was underway.<\/p>\n<p>Here\u2019s a more realistic proposal: if a pharmaceutical company receives federal funding to develop a pandemic-relevant medicine, those companies should, at a minimum, agree to voluntarily license their patents and\/or trade secrets to lower-income countries. A voluntary license is when the patent holder agrees to let <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wprx.com\/news\/2021\/7\/23\/manufacturing-generic-drugs-in-the-us-what-you-need-to-know#:~:text=system.-,US%20generic%20drug%20manufacturing,than%20by%20the%20manufacturer.,-The\">other manufacturers<\/a> produce and\/or sell the drug, typically at a lower cost.<\/p>\n<p>For example, consider the <a href=\"https:\/\/medicinespatentpool.org\/\">Medicines Patent Pool<\/a> (\u201cMPP\u201d). The MPP is a UN-backed public health organization established in 2010. It negotiates licenses directly with originator companies and sub-licenses them to qualified generic manufacturers in low and middle-income countries, driving down prices. Critically, the MPP has recognized that patent licenses alone are often insufficient (particularly for complex biologics) and has therefore made <a href=\"https:\/\/www.who.int\/initiatives\/mrna-technology-transfer-(mrna-tt)-programme#:~:text=The%20Medicines%20Patent%20Pool%20(MPP)%20covers%20areas%20including%20funding%2C%20legal%20frameworks%2C%20intellectual%20property%2C%20relationships%20with%20civil%20society%20organizations%2C%20communications%20and%20support%20for%20the%20technology%20transfer%20process.\">technology transfer<\/a> a part of its model. The MPP\u2019s technology transfer system helps facilitate the transfer of proprietary manufacturing know-how alongside the license itself. By requiring participation in the MPP as a condition of receiving federal grant money, pandemic-relevant medicines and how to make them can reach the people who need it most, efficiently and without delay.<\/p>\n<p>Another way this could take shape is by building these obligations directly into federal grant agreements. Congress could simply make this a condition of receiving NIH grants or other federal research and development support. Specifically, companies would commit in advance to: (a) licensing pandemic-relevant patents to manufacturers in lower-income countries; and (b) transferring the manufacturing know-how developed using those federal funds alongside that license. This could be structured the same way the MPP facilitates technology transfer alongside licensing. It would also complement any conditions NIH already attaches to its grants today.<\/p>\n<p>Another approach could be to require federally funded pharmaceutical projects to either dedicate a portion of their manufacturing output to developing countries at a low cost or co-invest in building local manufacturing capacity in those regions. This addresses a gap that licensing alone typically does not: even a valid voluntary license is useless to a country with no facility capable of producing the drug. Requiring manufacturers to either supply doses directly or help build the infrastructure to produce the drug locally ensures that access to the IP translates into actual access. Structured as a grant condition, this commitment would be negotiated upfront as part of the federal funding agreement, with output thresholds and pricing terms tied to a declared public health emergency, for instance.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u201cBut Won\u2019t This Kill Innovation?!\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>This is the pharmaceutical industry\u2019s go-to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.phrma.org\/policy-issues\/government-price-setting#:~:text=To%20lower%20prices,development%20and%20manufacturing.\">counterargument<\/a>. The innovation model depends on companies being able to recoup what they invest. Restricting their ability to price freely, the argument goes, removes the incentive to develop drugs in the first place.<\/p>\n<p>If a company developed a drug entirely with private money, that argument has some weight. The company took a risk and deserves a reward. But when taxpayers funded the foundational research, that argument is no longer sound. The public already took on the financial risk. These companies are still entitled to a return on the investment it made in trials, manufacturing, and commercialization. And, under this proposal they would still receive one. In wealthy markets, the company retains full commercial rights. There could also be built in mechanisms to prevent overuse, such as a trigger condition only during declared health emergencies from the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.who.int\/our-work\/health-emergencies#:~:text=WHO\u2019s%20Health%20Emergencies%20Programme%20works%20with%20all%20countries%20and%20partners%20to%20ensure%20the%20world%20is%20better%20prepared%20for%20all%2Dhazards%20health%20emergencies%20that%20threaten%20global%20health%20security.%C2%A0\">World Health Organization.<\/a> What they give up is the ability to price the developing world entirely out of a medicine the American public helped make possible.<\/p>\n<p>The proposal is narrow by design. And it is not a perfect solution. By preserving full commercial pricing rights in wealthy markets, it risks incentivizing companies to aggressively overcharge those markets to compensate for reduced revenue elsewhere. But doing nothing carries a moral cost that is harder to justify. That outcome is not an unfortunate side effect of a functioning system. It is a predictable result of one that was never designed with global access in mind. An imperfect reform that meaningfully improves access is worth more than a system that leaves certain populations behind.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The Next Pandemic Is Coming<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.pbs.org\/wgbh\/frontline\/article\/pandemic-preparedness-covid-19-global-health\/#:~:text=\">Scientists agree<\/a> that another pandemic is a matter of when, not if. The choices made today about who controls publicly funded medicines will determine who survives it. COVID showed us what happens when we leave access entirely to the market: wealthy countries get vaccines, and the rest of the world waits.<\/p>\n<p>The fix is not complicated. If your tax dollars paid for the science, the world should benefit from it. Contact your representatives and tell them: public funding should come with mandatory voluntary license conditions.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone size-medium wp-image-5141\" src=\"https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/blog2-300x240.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"240\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/blog2-300x240.png 300w, https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/blog2-112x90.png 112w, https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/blog2.png 687w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><br \/>\n<em>Thomas Rabaut<\/em><br \/>\n<em>Associate Blogger<\/em><br \/>\n<em>Loyola University Chicago School of Law, J.D. 2028<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The COVID-19 pandemic exposed an uncomfortable truth: when American taxpayers fund the science behind life-saving medicines, private companies still get to decide who can afford them. When Moderna developed its groundbreaking mRNA COVID vaccine, it did so on the back of decades of government-funded research and over $1 billion in federal grants from the National Institutes of Health (\u201cNIH\u201d). Taxpayers funded the science. But when &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/you-paid-for-that-vaccine-so-why-cant-the-world-afford-it\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">You Paid for That Vaccine. So Why Can\u2019t the World Afford It?<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":113,"featured_media":5296,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[428,9,10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5295","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-ip-health","category-patents","category-trade-secrets"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5295","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/113"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5295"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5295\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5298,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5295\/revisions\/5298"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/5296"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5295"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5295"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.luc.edu\/ipbytes\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5295"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}